

EMERGENCY PLANNING JOINT COMMITTEE

AGENDA

Thursday, 23 September 2010

at 2.00 pm

at The Emergency Planning Unit, Aurora House, Middlesbrough

MEMBERS: EMERGENCY PLANNING JOINT COMMITTEE:-

Hartlepool Borough Council:-

The Mayor, Stuart Drummond

Middlesbrough Borough Council:-

Councillor Julia Rostron

Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council:-

Councillor Dave McLuckie

Stockton Borough Council:-

Councillor Terry Laing

- 1. APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE**
- 2. TO RECEIVE ANY DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST BY MEMBERS**
- 3. MINUTES**
 - 3.1 To receive the minutes of the meeting held on 30 June 2010

4. REPORTS OF CHIEF EMERGENCY PLANNING OFFICER

- 4.1 The UK Central Response: Concept of Operations (CONOPS) – *Chief Emergency Planning Officer*
- 4.2 2012 London Olympic and Paralympic Games – *Chief Emergency Planning Officer*
- 4.3 Post of Resilience Forum Assistant – *Chief Emergency Planning Officer*
- 4.4 Lessons Learned from Exercise Plata – *Chief Emergency Planning Officer*
- 4.5 Influx of British Nationals Plan – *Chief Emergency Planning Officer*
- 4.6 Hartlepool Tall Ships Race – *Chief Emergency Planning Officer*
- 4.7 Severe Winter Weather and Council Winter Maintenance Programmes – *Chief Emergency Planning Officer*
- 4.8 Management of the Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS) and National Resilience Extranet (NRE) update – *Chief Emergency Planning Officer*
- 4.9 Town Centre Evacuation Planning – *Chief Emergency Planning Officer*
- 4.10 Reported Incidents / Cleveland Communications Strategy – *Chief Emergency Planning Officer*
- 4.11 Tour of the New Accommodation with Chief Emergency Planning Officer

5. ANY OTHER BUSINESS

6. DATE AND TIME OF NEXT MEETING TO BE CONFIRMED

EMERGENCY PLANNING JOINT COMMITTEE

MINUTES AND DECISION RECORD

30 June 2010

The meeting commenced at 12 noon at Cleveland Police Authority,
Ladgate Lane, Middlesbrough

Present:

The Mayor, Stuart Drummond, Hartlepool Borough Council
Councillor Terry Laing, Stockton Borough Council
Councillor Julia Rostron, Middlesbrough Borough Council

Denis Hampson, Chief Emergency Planning Officer
Alyson Carr, Assistant Chief Accountant
Jo Wilson, Democratic Services Officer

1. Appointment of Chair

That Councillor Terry Laing (Stockton Borough Council) be elected Chair of the Committee

Councillor Laing in the Chair

The Chair thanked the former member for Middlesbrough Borough Council, Barry Coppinger, for his work during the previous 3 years and Sarah Bird for her production of the minutes of meetings and overall administrative support.

2. Apologies for absence

Apologies were submitted from Councillor Dave McLuckie, Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council

3. Declarations of interest by members

None

4. Confirmation of the minutes of the meeting held on 26th March 2010

Confirmed as a true record

5. CEPU Annual Plan 2010-2011 (*Chief Emergency Planning Officer*)

Purpose of report

To present to members of the Cleveland Emergency Joint Committee the Annual Plan for the Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit for the year 2010-11

Issue(s) for consideration by the Committee

This plan was prepared to give the four Local Authorities an overview of the Emergency Planning Unit (EPU), its work-streams and priorities over the next 12 months, and how it would measure its performance against a number of performance indicators. There was an emphasis on ensuring the local authorities are as well prepared as possible to respond adequately to a major incident or emergency. 14 significant themes had been identified upon which the EPU would focus during the year. Highlighted in particular was planning around the forthcoming Tall Ships event in Hartlepool.

Members were further advised of a 3% increase in the EPU budget which would be used primarily for salary increments and increases through job evaluation. Costs associated with the planned move of the EPU to new offices would be met through increased financial management and efficiencies. Notable achievements during the year were reported including distribution of the "Prepare for Emergencies" public information leaflet. The complete annual plan was appended to the report.

The Chair referred to item 1.9 of the plan, annual auditing of the work of the EPU through the national assessment programme created through the 'Expectations and Indicators of Best Practice Set' introduced by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. The Chief Emergency Planning Officer advised that the EPU were in the process of completing the required evidence, all of which was in place. Members queried what effect the election of the coalition government was expected to have on Emergency Planning. The Chief Emergency Planning Officer had been advised that there were no changes planned however all Government Departments would be expected to instigate spending cuts so there might be budgetary pressures in the future. This could lead to reductions in auditing, performance indicators and Health & Safety, all of which would have ramifications on the bigger picture. The Chair suggested that charging outside agencies and other Local Authorities for the advisory services of the EPU could be a source of revenue.

Decision

- I. That the report be noted.
- II. That the Annual Plan, including the performance indicators and budget provision, be endorsed.

6. Review of Performance Indicators 2009/10 (*Chief Emergency Planning Officer*)

Purpose of report

To inform the Joint Committee of the results and progress made on achieving the performance indicators set down in the 2009/10 Annual Plan of the Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit.

Issue(s) for consideration by the Committee

The report detailed the progress made towards achieving the performance indicators previously set in order to monitor and review progress and performance.

There were a total of 21 performance indicators for 2009/10, all had been achieved in full or in part. Details were given of those targets which had not been fully achieved as follows:

- To enrol a Senior Elected Member on a course at the Emergency Planning College – while this had not happened many had received ‘in-house’ awareness training
- To hold 4 meetings with the voluntary agencies – 3 had been held
- To hold 2 meetings with Event Planning Teams – 1 had been held, however the main focus of Event Planning Teams becoming accustomed to establishing Safety Advisory Teams when planning large events had been achieved

Notable achievements were highlighted including the public distribution of the “Prepare for Emergencies” leaflet. It was also noted there had only been 66 days of sick leave taken by the Team throughout the year.

Members queried what contingencies were in place should the Chief Emergency Planning Officer take long-term sickness leave. The Chief Emergency Planning Officer indicated that there was enough capacity within the EPU to cover this eventuality however it would be a very steep learning curve and there would be little spare capacity. He acknowledged the need to train someone to take on his role and responsibilities for the future.

Decision

That the report be noted.

7. Freedom of Information Act – Emergency Planning Publication Scheme *(Chief Emergency Planning Officer)*

Purpose of report

To present to members a draft Freedom of Information Publication Scheme that will be utilised in the future for both the Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit and the Emergency Planning Joint Committee.

To seek approval from Members to adopt the draft publication scheme.

Issue(s) for consideration by the Committee

A recent audit of the Emergency Planning Joint Committee (EPJC) considered the EPJC to be an outside body and as such it should be required to have its own publication scheme for the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act 2000. In order to comply with this the EPU website would be revamped to show the role of the EPJC, providing details of the constitution of the committee and terms of reference. Minutes of meetings would also be made available through the website as would details of the FOI publication scheme.

Decision

- I. That the report be noted
- II. That the draft Freedom of Information publication scheme for the Joint Committee and the Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit be approved
- III. That the scheme be overseen by the Chief Emergency Planning Officer on behalf of the Joint Committee and administered within the Emergency Planning Unit.

8. 2009/10 Revenue Outturn Report *(Chief Finance Officer)*

Purpose of report

To provide details of the revenue outturn for the Cleveland Emergency Planning Joint Committee for the year 2009/2010

Issue(s) for consideration by the Committee

The Accounts and Audit (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2006 require accounts to be approved by 30th June each year. At the end of each financial year an annual revenue outturn report is submitted to the committee, details of which are included in the Statement of Accounts. In 2009/10 the projected outturn variance was expected to be favourable by £19,424 with the final outturn position a favourable variance of £33,357. This underspend would be used to fund costs associated with the forthcoming premises move. The 2009/10 Statement of Accounts for the EPJC was appended to the report.

The Chair queried whether the reserves were too large and understood that the recommended limit was 3%. The Assistant Chief Accountant advised that this is the level recommended by the Audit Commission for the level of Local Authority Un earmarked General Fund Reserves, however, given the limited size of the organisation and the potential risks facing all Local Government funded services, the amount currently held was not thought to be unreasonable.

Decision

That the 2009/2010 Revenue Outturn Report and Statement of Accounts be approved.

9. 2009/2010 Annual Audit Return *(Chief Finance Officer)*

Purpose of report

To provide details of the Annual Audit Return to the Audit Commission for the Cleveland Emergency Planning Joint Committee for the year 2009/2010.

Issue(s) for consideration by the Committee

The Accounts and Audit Regulations 2003 require all smaller relevant bodies in England to complete an annual return summarising their annual activities. This must be approved by 30th June, signed by the appropriate responsible officers and Members and sent to the Audit Commission for auditing. A copy of the return was appended to the report, covering accounting statements, an annual governance statement and an annual internal audit report.

The Chair queried why the amount quoted for staff costs in the Outturn Report did not agree to the figure on the Audit Return. The Assistant Chief Accountant advised that this was likely to be a presentation issue and that the specific requirements of the return would differ slightly from the way information was presented in the Management Accounts.

Decision

That the 2009/2010 Annual Audit Return be approved.

10 Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice – Maintaining Plans *(Chief Emergency Planning Officer)*

Purpose of report

To inform members of further details of the new Civil Contingencies Act Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice document.

Issue(s) for consideration by the Committee

The Chief Emergency Planning Officer advised Members of the requirements under Section 2B of the Civil Contingencies Act, namely:

- Section 2(1) (d) - To maintain plans for the purpose of ensuring that if an emergency occurs or is likely to occur the person or body is able to continue to perform his or her functions so far as necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing the emergency, reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects and taking other action in connection with it
- Section 2 (1) (e) - To consider whether a risk assessment makes it necessary or expedient for the person or body to add to or modify emergency plans maintained under section 2 (1) (d)

A report showing evidence that the EPU were fulfilling these requirements had been compiled following consultation with emergency planning officers for the local authorities, emergency services and other category 1 responders. This was appended to the report. Evidence was being considered further by the Local Resilience Working Group to ensure all responders were contributing fully however it was felt that the evidence provided was more than sufficient to meet Government requirements.

Decision

That the evidence produced be endorsed as demonstrated that the indicators are being adequately met.

11 Site Clearance Plan (*Chief Emergency Planning Officer*)

Purpose of report

To inform Members that new guidance has been issued by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat on the requirement for Local Authorities and other Category 1 responders to have in place a Site Clearance Capability.

To inform Members that this requirement will be subject to measurement through the National Capabilities Survey that will be carried out in early Summer 2010.

To inform Members that the Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit, in consultation with partner agencies, has prepared a plan in accord with this guidance.

Issue(s) for consideration by the Committee

A Site Clearance Plan had been produced in line with the significant risks as shown within the latest version of the Cleveland Community Risk Register. It

was clear that no single approach would be appropriate in all circumstances and the priorities would be scenario specific having regard to the normal functions of affected structures, their location, the extent of damage and the risks presented. Should a major incident occur necessitating a site clearance operation teams would be formed under the direction of the Recovery Working Group. This would be led by the Local Authority in whose area the incident occurred, to be Chaired by their Chief Executive. Details of the proposed Incident Management Structure were appended to the report. The plan would be reviewed annually and subject to test through either a table top exercise or multi-agency training day within the next 18 months.

Copies of the plan were available through the EPU. The Chair queried whether reports previously submitted to the committee were available via the EPU website. The Chief Emergency Planning Officer confirmed this.

Decision

That the report be noted

That the Site Clearance Plan be endorsed for use by the Local Authorities should the need arise.

12 Consultation on Draft Community Resilience Proposals *(Chief Emergency Planning Officer)*

Purpose of report

To inform Members that four consultation documents have been issued by the Cabinet Office relating to the Governments' proposed future Community Resilience Programme.

To seek the views of Members to allow the Chief Emergency Planning Officer to prepare a response to the documents on behalf of the Emergency Planning Unit and Joint Committee and send a reply to the Cabinet Office by the closing date of 1st July 2010.

Issue(s) for consideration by the Committee

The Chief Emergency Planning Officer gave details of the following consultation documents relating to the Governments' proposed future Community Resilience Programme:

- a. Community Resilience Programme
- b. Draft Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience
- c. Draft Community Emergency Plan Guidance (and template)
- d. Draft Preparing for Emergencies – a guide for communities

The foremost aim of Community Resilience was to promote self help during

an emergency situation, both individually and also in a family or community setting. It was acknowledged however that this would not happen without help from the existing emergency planning community. It was envisaged that existing community groups, such as parish councils and residents associations, formulate emergency plans for their community. These plans would then be considered and amended by the Emergency Planners. This would clearly lead to more work for the EPU.

Copies of the consultation documents were appended to the report with a deadline for responses of 1st July 2010

The Government also intended to produce a “preparing for emergencies” booklet for distribution to every household in England and Wales. The content would be similar to the leaflet produced by the EPU. Previous consultation carried out by the EPU had shown that most people did not recall receiving previous government booklets and had not retained it whereas around 75% had retained the smaller leaflet distributed by the EPU.

The Chair acknowledged Community Resilience would lead to an increase in workload for the EPU. He suggested that existing channels be used to disseminate the information such as Parish Council, Neighbourhood Forum and Renaissance meetings

Decision

That the report be noted.

13 Critical Infrastructure Programme (*Chief Emergency Planning Officer*)

Purpose of report

To inform Members of three documents produced by the Cabinet Office as part of the Governments Critical Infrastructure Resilience Programme.

To inform Members that the Cabinet Office expects these documents to inform Emergency Planners on behalf of Local Authorities of the need to encompass these documents within future planning arrangements, so that should a major incident or emergency occur, concerns over critical infrastructure should be a primary focus within any response or recovery phase.

To inform Members that although this report relates to the national programme and local critical infrastructure is not identified, it is still appropriate due to the dependencies and interdependencies within and between various economic and sub regional sectors. For example, a critical infrastructure affected in the Tyne and Wear area could have a ‘knock on effect’ to Cleveland.

Issue(s) for consideration by the Committee

Members were advised that the aim of the critical infrastructure programme was to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure and essential services to severe disruption from natural hazards. The national infrastructure was defined as those facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of the country and the delivery of essential services upon which daily life in the UK depends. The main goal was to identify and assess the risks from natural hazards, finding options to counter the risk. Infrastructure would be prioritised nationally then locally using a risk based approach. Flooding would be the first focus of the Programme as the highest climate risk in the Governments National Risk Register.

The National Hazards Team had produced the following documents to support the programme:

- a. The Strategic Framework and Policy Statement – to set out proposals for a cross-sector systematic programme to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure and essential services to severe disruption by natural hazards
- b. The Sector Resilience Plan for 2010 – to set out the priorities for improving resilience within each sector, reduce vulnerability and improve preparedness and business continuity. There were nine sectors, covering areas such as energy, water, communications, healthcare and transportation.
- c. The Interim Guidance to the Economic Regulated Sectors – to be issued to economic regulators encouraging resilience building by critical infrastructure operators

The Chief Emergency Planning Officer indicated that nowhere in the area covered by the EPU was at risk however work was underway to identify and protect sub-stations which might be at risk. The current flood plan would also be reviewed to include the national infrastructure and consideration be given to plans to protect the road infrastructure leading to PD Ports and the new Asda and Tesco distribution depots.

Decision

- I. That the report be noted
- II. That the documents issued under the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure Programme be taken into account by the Chief Emergency Planning Officer within any future emergency planning and response arrangements
- III. That the Cleveland EPU review the multi-agency Flood Plan to identify any assets which may be at risk in the Cleveland area
- IV. That the Cleveland EPU take into consideration any assets which may

be at risk when producing the Reservoir Inundation plans on behalf of the local authorities.

14 Reported Incidents / Cleveland Communications Strategy *(Chief Emergency Planning Officer)*

Purpose of report

To inform Members of the Emergency Planning Joint Committee of the incidents reported, severe weather and flood risk warnings received and communications strategy faxes received and dealt with by the Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit. The report covered the period between 1st March and 31st May 2010 (3 month period).

Issue(s) for consideration by the Committee

A total of 5 Met Office warnings of adverse weather conditions were received, mostly due to the extreme winter weather which continued into April 2010. Also linked into weather related incidents were the effects of the Icelandic volcanic ash cloud, resulting in 17 top line Government briefings. The Chief Emergency Planning Officer had provided briefings to senior management teams, including those at the University Hospital of North Tees, on the potential effects of business continuity. 30 blue information faxes had also been received.

There had been 6 incidents of note in the past 3 months involving the EPU, some of which had led to the deployment of staff to the scene or to incident command rooms. Details of these were appended to the report.

Decision

That the report be noted.

P J DEVLIN

CHIEF SOLICITOR

PUBLICATION DATE: 8th July 2010

CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT

Report to: Emergency Planning Joint Committee

From: Chief Emergency Planning Officer

Date: 23 September 2010

Subject: The UK Central Response: Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To inform Members that the Cabinet Office on behalf of the Government have issued a new Concept of Operations that sets out the arrangements for how Central Government will respond to a large scale emergency that requires co-ordinated central government action. The document looks into how central government response will be organised, together with the relationship between the central, regional and local tiers.
- 1.2 To inform Members that the main part of the document focuses on the response to no notice or short notice emergencies requiring UK central government engagement, whilst stressing that the approach can also be adapted to manage the response to other crisis.
- 1.2 To inform Members that the original Concept of Operations document was issued in 2005 and the updated version reflects revised arrangements that have been adopted due to recent national emergencies and inquiries, for example the Pitt report following serious flooding.
- 1.3 To inform Members that in addition to the national Concept of Operations being issued, the North East Regional Response plan (version one) was issued in July 2010 and provides a regional view whereas the CONOPS document gives a national overview. The regional plan provides details on the roles and responsibilities of regional resilience team, regional agencies and other multi agencies and their functions during an emergency. One of the principle aims of the plan is to set out the arrangements to activate the regional crisis management machinery with the intention of ensuring a strategic response to incidents requiring multi agency co-ordination on a pan North East basis. It contains a separate section which details the specific response arrangements of the Government Office North East, although this is likely to change due to the potential abolition of Government Offices in the Regions within the next 12 months.

2. Background

- 2.1 As defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 an emergency is a situation or series of events that threatens or causes serious damage to human welfare, the environment or security in the United Kingdom. Arrangements need to be in place and have the flexibility to adapt to the circumstances at the time.
- 2.2 The CONOPS document (190 pages) describes the Central Government arrangements for responding to and recovering from emergencies, irrespective of cause or location and which require co-ordinated central government action. These arrangements build upon the roles of Lead Government Departments and focus on the core characteristics of effective emergency response. Eight guiding principles have been developed to be applied to the management of any emergency.
- Preparedness
 - Continuity
 - Subsidiary
 - Direction
 - Integration
 - Communication
 - Co-operation
 - Anticipation
- 2.3 The document identifies three main phases of an emergency, namely preparation, response and recovery, with the response phase comprising of two separate but closely related challenges: crisis management and consequence management.
- 2.4 The CONOPS emphasises the principle of subsidiarity and the importance of local decision making, with support from central Government where necessary. It then identifies three levels/types of emergency which may require direct central government engagement and co-ordination at a higher level. These are:
- Significant emergency – Level 1
 - Serious emergency – Level 2
 - Catastrophic emergency - Level 3
- 2.5 **Level 1** – an emergency that has a wider focus and requires central government involvement or support, primarily from a lead government department, alongside the local agencies (emergency services, local authorities etc). There is however no actual or potential requirement for a collective central government response.
- 2.6 **Level 2** – an emergency which has or threatens a wide or prolonged impact and thus requires sustained central government co-ordination and support from a number of departments or agencies and the

regional tier. The government's response would be co-ordinated from COBR under the leadership of the lead government department.

- 2.7 **Level 3** – an emergency that has an exceptionally high or potentially widespread impact and requires central government's direction and support. This would be a top-down response and include circumstances where local responses were overwhelmed or emergency powers enacted.
- 2.8 The document concludes that there are sometimes significant knock-on consequences even from straightforward events that will necessitate central government engagement and the level of central government engagement can change over time (both up and down) as the demands of an emergency change.

3. Central Government Arrangements

- 3.1 If the scale of an emergency requires the support or co-ordination of central government, a designated lead government department (LGD) will be responsible for the overall management of the central government response, in most cases this will be through COBR. The LGD is responsible for ensuring that it has appropriate plans in place to enable it to manage the emergencies on which they lead. The LGD will also ensure that adequate resources are available and will lead on parliamentary handling of the situation. A pre-designated list of LGDs is maintained covering leadership of planning, response and recovery phases to a wide range of emergencies. This list and the description of the roles, responsibilities and alerting arrangements for each LGD can be found at:
<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/response/ukgovernment/handling.aspx>.

The Central Government's Concept of Operations focuses on the response to no-notice or short notice emergencies which require UK Central Government engagement.

- 3.2 When a local Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) is established and COBR has been activated (levels 2 or 3), a Government Liaison Office (GLO) will normally be dispatched immediately at the onset of an emergency to attend the SCG.
- 3.3 The CONOPS provides central government with a set of guiding principles that should be adhered to in an emergency and which support a clearly identifiable set of objectives. These strategic objectives for the central Government response are to:
- Protect human life and, as far as possible, property, and alleviate suffering;
 - Support the continuity of everyday activity and the restoration of disrupted services at the earliest opportunity; and
 - Uphold the rule of law and the democratic process.

It recognises that not all objectives are achievable from the outset, but the CONOPS states that Ministers will provide early strategic direction on the appropriate balance to strike in light of circumstances at the time.

- 3.4 The CONOPS identifies that in an emergency which requires a co-ordinated central government response, there will also be the need for national co-ordination of public information from the outset. Central government will be responsible for the national communications strategy for responding to the emergency, the development of which will be co-ordinated with the lead local responder. In such circumstances, the News Co-ordination Centre will be activated by the Cabinet Office to co-ordinate the communications effort.
- 3.5 The document also describes the present role of Government Offices in the English Regions and in particular their role in providing a two way flow of information between central Government and the local response. It also describes the role of the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee that could be set up to support response and recovery activity across the region.

4. **North East Regional Response plan**

- 4.1 As stated, following the publication of the UK Central Government arrangements for responding to an emergency, the revised North East Regional Response plan was issued for comment.

The objectives of the plan are to:

- Summarise the recognised corporate basis of emergency response for the region.
- Provide a recognised corporate framework for the Regional Tier to participate with local responders in any combined response.
- Identify the key capabilities, plans, and procedures that could be implemented, depending on the nature of the emergency.
- Outline roles and responsibilities of agencies within those plans and procedures.
- Provide a framework for mutual understanding between the various partner agencies described in the plan, raising awareness throughout the North East, developing training and exercising, and building ownership of civil protection throughout the region.
- Provide a basis for joining up the various work streams of the North East Regional Resilience forum in a single document.

- 4.2 Feedback on the regional response plan was requested by GONE by 20th August and this has been provided to GONE by the Chief Emergency Planning Officer.

5. Action by the Emergency Planning Unit

- 5.1 All emergency planners have been made aware of these two documents and their linkages to other plans.
- 5.2 The Chief Emergency Planning Officer will ensure that the appropriate information and linkages from these two documents is incorporated into the Cleveland Major Incident Procedures Manual. The manual is currently being reviewed and thus the publication of these two documents is opportune.
- 5.3 Where appropriate, details of the documents will be incorporated into other plans produced by the EPU at the time of plan reviews.

6. Recommendations

- 6.1 The report is noted.
- 6.2 Members note the existence of these two concepts of operations and how and when regional resilience and central Government will become involved in an emergency, either at the response or recovery stage, and by what means e.g. Lead Government Department.

Report Author: Denis Hampson
Chief Emergency Planning Officer

Report date: 10th September 2010

CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT

Report to: Cleveland Emergency Planning Joint Committee
From: Chief Emergency Planning Officer
Date: 23 September 2010
Subject: **2012 London Olympic and Paralympic Games**

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To provide Members with an insight into the organisation of the 2012 London Olympic and Paralympic Games (The Games) along with an update into the present situation relating to matters which may impact upon the Cleveland area.

2. Background

- 2.1 The Games represent the most significant peacetime planning and security challenge ever faced within the United Kingdom.

Some key Olympics facts illustrate the scale of the challenge:

- 10,500 athletes from over 200 countries;
- 300 events across 26 sports in 33 locations;
- 250,000 accredited people;
- 8.6m tickets for the main games;
- 1.5m tickets for the Paralympic games;
- 2,000 press and media;
- 100 Heads of State at the opening ceremony;
- £10b of associated economic activity;
- A policing operation spanning a 'games period' from 14th June (venue 'lockdown') to 9th September (Paralympic closing ceremony);

Outside London, other Olympic venues include:

- Hertfordshire Canoeing;
- Essex Cycling;
- Berkshire Rowing;
- Dorset Sailing;
- Manchester Football;
- Cardiff Football;
- Birmingham Football;
- Glasgow Football;
- Newcastle Football.

2.2 Pre Games Training Camps

Prior to the Games, Olympic nations will locate their teams at Pre-Games Training Camps (PGTC). These camps could be spread throughout the United Kingdom. All organisations are free to offer facilities for training camps. However One North East has produced a marketing brochure containing details of potential camps throughout the North East. This has been done in order to vet organisations and venues to ensure they are capable of offering the best level of service and to offer advice to those organisations wishing to bring their facilities up to the required standard. Potential training camps in the Cleveland area are:

- Hartlepool Marina;
- Tees Barrage;
- Middlesbrough Football Club;
- Teesside University;
- Durham University, Queens Campus, Stockton.

Although there has been interest shown by various countries in respect of these locations, at this time none of the potential camps have had confirmed interest.

2.3 Olympic Torch Relay

The London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (LOCOG) is the Olympic group with responsibility for delivering the Games. A part of their responsibility is the Torch Relay. They have made a commitment that during its journey around the United Kingdom the Torch will:

- Be within one hour's journey of 95% of the population;
- Spend at least four days in each of the Nations (Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland)
- Spend at least three days in each region (the North East region bounded by the Northumbria, Durham and Cleveland Police areas)
- Take in photograph opportunities at various locations including iconic landmarks, areas of cultural significance, areas of outstanding natural beauty, Industrial areas, areas of deprivation and locations of sporting interest.

The relay will be a continuous journey. Each day the Torch will be carried by 300 Torch Bearers who will be from the host area. It is expected that the majority of Bearers will be from the 15 to 25 age group. There will be overnight stops at various towns and cities along the route with breaks for lunch. The overnight stops are expected to generate a great deal of interest from the public. They are likely to involve a ceremonial acceptance by the host city / town followed by a

two hour show delivered by the relay sponsor. The design of the route is based upon information supplied to LOCOG by local authorities throughout the UK along with the requirements of the Relay sponsor.

All local authorities from this area have submitted proposals for the route. The route is still in the national planning stage but a draft is expected by the end of this year. At this time it is hoped that we will have a rough idea when/if the Relay will reach this area.

The Torch Relay will bring significant planning and security issues. These will be split between the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the Police Force and the Local Authorities Events Team/Emergency Planning Unit covering the area that the Torch is in at any given point. The MPS will be responsible for security of the Torch itself with the host Police Force having responsibility for the security of the route.

2.4 Regional Planning

A Regional Board and a Regional Operations Group has been established under the auspices of One North East, although this is likely to change following the announcement that One North East will close by March 2012. The Operational Group is tasked with delivering 2012 benefits across the region, legacy outcomes and engagement and acting as the Torch Relay advisory group.

2.5 Police Planning

The security and policing of the Olympic Venues will require significant aid from other Police Forces across the UK and to aid this, the Police National Information and Coordination Centre (PNICC) on behalf of the Olympic and Paralympic Policing Coordination Team (OPPCT) have already carried out a significant amount of work with Police forces, including Cleveland Police. That work has identified the numbers of specialist and non specialist officers in each Police force. PNICC are facilitating ongoing scoping exercises in order identify the number of specialist and non specialist officers each Police Force will be required to provide for Mutual Aid to the Games. To aid this, a Cleveland Police Planning Group has been established to examine the impact of providing mutual aid to other forces with Olympic venues and the policing of events, e.g. Torch Relay, with Cleveland. The Chief Emergency Planning Officer has been co-opted onto this group in his capacity as the LRF Manager, primarily to ensure the sharing of information and intelligence across partner agencies.

2.6 Local Planning

Events Teams within each of the four local authorities have begun to explore the impact upon their local areas from the Olympics and the events that normally occur during the period when the Olympics are to take place. The Emergency Planning Unit has begun to co-ordinate details of all the events being planned across the Cleveland area.

The Chief Emergency Planning Officer in consultation with the Chief Superintendent, Operational Planning, intend to establish a group with representatives from the four local authorities, Police, Fire Brigade and Ambulance to ensure that a co-ordinated approach is taken at an early stage and an oversight is maintained across the Cleveland area. It will also ensure that organisations understand their responsibilities in relation to the games and the Cultural Olympiad.

There is little doubt that events planning will need to take place across the area and this will include resilience / emergency planning and thus involve the EPU. Local Authorities will have a requirement to make necessary arrangements for the Torch Relay including Temporary Traffic Regulation Order where required

3. Recommendations

- 3.1 Members note the report.
- 3.2 Members note the actions being undertaken by the Chief Emergency Planning Officer and the potential impact that the Games will have on EPU and the service it provides.

Report Author: Denis Hampson
Chief Emergency Planning Officer

Report date: 10 September 2010

CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT

Report to: Emergency Planning Joint Committee
From: Chief Emergency Planning Officer
Date: 23 September 2010
Subject: **Post of Resilience Forum Assistant**

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To inform Members that the Cleveland Local Resilience Forum at their meeting on 2nd September 2010 agreed to funding the post of the Resilience Forum Assistant (RFA) within the Emergency Planning Unit for a further three years.

2. The Post

- 2.1 The post was created three years ago with the purpose to assist the Chief Emergency Planning Officer in his capacity as the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) Manager in the provision of a comprehensive secretariat and support function to the Cleveland Local Resilience Forum, and to assist in the provision of all aspects of civil contingencies and emergency planning and preparedness.
- 2.2 The Resilience Forum Assistant (RFA) also provides a comprehensive secretariat function to the principal working groups of the LRF, namely the Local Resilience Working Group, the Cleveland Media Emergency Forum and the Flood Risk sub group. In this role, the RFA organises meetings, acts as secretary/minute taker and prepares the draft minutes. To ensure the effectiveness of the LRF and groups, the RFA compiles and maintains both paper based and IT filing systems.
- 2.3 The Chief Emergency Planning Officer considers that the post has proven invaluable to the smooth functioning of the LRF; its groups and subgroups and has provided value for money. It assists in providing an effective LRF administration, for example, filing system, agendas, minutes and actions for each group are kept up to date. The RFA also keeps track of all documentation coming out from the 'centre' in the form of national resilience gateway bulletins and other documentation. The role has also allowed for more reports to be researched and prepared.
- 2.4 The volume of work shows no signs of abating and there is an expectation that the work of the LRF will grow as a result of the Civil

Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme and the potential abolition of Government Offices in the Regions. Further, additional time is needed to ensure the LRF website is an effective tool to provide information to the public.

- 2.5 Policies and procedures are ever changing and new demands being placed upon the LRF, as identified in recent guidance issued by the Cabinet Office, particularly the Expectations and Indicators of Best Practice set.
- 2.6 Funding for this post was originally secured from LRF members in 2007 and the RFA was appointed in January 2008 with the commitment of a three year fixed term contract. This was due to expire in January 2011 and therefore as that period was coming to a conclusion, the Chief Emergency Planning Officer took a report to the Cleveland LRF on 2nd September seeking a further commitment from LRF members to continue to fund the post and with a recommendation that the contract be extended for a further 3 years until January 2014 when again the post would be reviewed.
- 2.7 At the LRF, continuation of the post and funding commitment was approved. The present level of funding was agreed for the next three years, with the financial commitment from each LRF organisation remaining at the present levels. Any inflationary increases and pay awards/increments will be met from within the present funding arrangements. The amount of funding committed from LRF members is £21,000 yearly.
- 2.8 This post is within the present structural plan of the Emergency Planning Unit.
- 2.9 It should be noted that both Durham and Northumbria LRFs have within the past year appointed a full time LRF Officer to undertake similar work to that undertaken by the RFA in Cleveland.

3. Recommendation

- 3.1 That Members note the report.

Report Author: Denis Hampson
Chief Emergency Planning Officer

Report date: 10 September 2010

CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT

Report to: Emergency Planning Joint Committee
From: Chief Emergency Planning Officer
Date: 23 September 2010
Subject: **Lessons Learned from Exercise Plata**

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To provide Members with details of the feedback and a summary of actions following Exercise Plata which was based upon a release from Hartlepool Power Station held on 19th May 2010.
- 1.2 To provide details of how the actions that have been identified for local determination will be taken forward as a result of learning from the exercise. These actions are separate to those in the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) exercise report.

2. Background

- 2.1 Exercise Plata held on the 19th May 2010 was a level two nuclear exercise as defined by the NII to meet the requirements of the Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations (REPPPIR). It was designed to test the onsite and offsite response to a release of radioactive material. By legislation, a level two exercise must be performed at least every three years and meet the satisfaction of the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate.
- 2.2 The majority of responding agencies, and in particular the Police and Local Authorities, were involved to some extent in the exercise, which required the activation of:
 - Gold Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG),
 - Silver Command,
 - Scientific Technical Advice Cell (STAC),
 - Strategic Media Advice Cell (SMAC),
 - Radiation Monitoring and Survivor Reception Centre (SRC).
- 2.3 The exercise was planned by the Cleveland multi-agency exercise planning group, although the primary lead was taken by British Energy Planners from Barnwood in Gloucestershire. In addition to the full group meetings, there were several smaller meetings held between emergency services and local authority planners at the EPU.

3. Outcome

- 3.1 It is important to state clearly that the exercise has been recognised as a successful test of the REPPIR offsite plan by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) representative and this is being reported into Government.
- 3.2 An official debrief report has been produced by British Energy in conjunction with agencies involved in the exercise which will feed into the Hartlepool Emergency Planning Consultative Committee (EPCC) and where applicable the national Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group (NEPLG). That report follows a nationally agreed template and categories.
- 3.3 The main issues to be taken further external to Cleveland are:
 - Review of the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) arrangements as they relate to a nuclear incident (NII, HPA, BE).
 - Review of the content of the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) training day (NEPLG)
 - Review of the countermessure advice form used by the nuclear industry (NEPLG / BE)
 - Requirement for a greater commitment to exercises from the Food Standards Agency (NII / NEPLG)
- 3.4 A copy of the report is available from the Local Authority EPO and REPPIR lead.
- 3.5 Due to the focus on transferable issues, several issues identified during the debrief process and of relevance to emergency planners and agencies in Cleveland were not included in the official debrief but are taken forward in the local action plan contained at appendix A of this report. This ensures that the learning which can benefit the local emergency responders is not lost and remedial action is taken.

4. Recommendations

- 4.1 Members note that Exercise Plata was a successful test of the current offsite plan produced by the Emergency Planning Unit in compliance with REPPIR.
- 4.2 Members note the report.
- 4.3 Members note the lessons learned and the action plan shown at appendix 'A' and support the officers tasked with taking these actions forward.
- 4.4 Members note that the REPPIR plan will be reviewed within the next 12 months to capture lessons learned / completed action points.

- 4.5 Members agree that the action plan is managed by the Principal Emergency Planning Officer as chair of the LRF Exercise Planning Group.

Report Author: Denis Hampson
Chief Emergency Planning Officer

Report dated: 12 September 2010

Appendix 'A'

Recommended Actions

No.	Issue	Proposed Action	Responsibility	Proposed Target Date
1	Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) There was a significant amount of criticism of the Health led STAC by SCG players. Many requests were made which remained unanswered for the duration of the exercise. During the debrief it was stated that much of the information requested of STAC was not within their remit to provide e.g. specific information on if responders were safe at a given point. There was also the suggestion that the STAC would not be in place to provide the level of information requested for some time.	Review of the NE STAC Plan including confirmation/ clarification of the role of STAC in relation to the Nuclear Operators Company Room.	Director of Public Health	September 2011
		Better training of officers in the role of the STAC	CEPU / HPA	September 2011
		In future exercises, there will be either a slower deployment of STAC or clearly stated and recorded exercise dynamics.	Exercise Planning Group / Lead planner	All future exercises involving a STAC
2	Strategic Media Advice Cell (SMAC) The Strategic Media Advice Cell also received significant criticism from agencies. This police lead function was cited by several agencies as being slow to provide general safety messages to the wider public.	Review the CLRF media co-ordination plan, detailing which facilities are available to communicate with the public and how these are accessed.	Cleveland Police to lead supported by CEPU	March 2011
			CEPU to incorporate into offsite plan.	September 2011

			Media training to be included as part of SCC day.	September 2011
3	Radiation Monitoring Regional Medical Physics Department (RMPD) The RMPD were slow to be established and on arrival at the Survivor Reception Centre seemed unsure of the exercise dynamics.	Better communication required prior to the exercise between RMPD and LA Exercise planners.	Local Authority / CLRF exercise planning group.	All future exercises involving RMPD
4	Survivor Reception Centre (SRC) There appeared in post exercise feedback to be an expectation of leadership/coordination of RMPD resources/staff from the Local Authority SRC Management. This is not the current understanding as shown in the REPPIR / CEPU plans.	A meeting to resolve these issues	RMPD / Local Authority EPO.	December 2010
		Clearly outline in the offsite plan responsibility and management.	CEPU Nuclear / REPPIR lead officer	September 2011
5	Local Authority Communications Communication between Silver and Gold and the Local Authority Borough Emergency Centre. The silver officers in attendance often found they were cut out of the communication loop between Gold and the Borough Emergency Centre at Ladgate Lane.	Better real time logging is required – NRE may provide a solution. Recognition that Silver will be cut out of some communications e.g. BCM issues	LA CEPU to monitor availability of logging linked to NRE. Then test during future exercises.	March 2011

6	Provision of counter measures to local industry Large industrial units outside the DEPZ were identified as potential recipients of KI tablets (potassium iodate). Additional work should be taken to plan rapid distribution to such locations.	Discussion required with health as to the best means of supplying countermeasures to those likely to shelter just outside the PIZ.	HPA / PCT / CEPU	December 2010
		Identification of large concentrations of industry outside the DEPZ, with details put into the REPPIR plan.	CEPU	September 2011
7	Location of NEAS Gold An issue was raised regarding the best location for Ambulance gold within the SCC. After discussion it was felt that the most appropriate location is the current one i.e. co-located with other emergency service at least for the initial response to an incident. Later as the longer term issue become more predominate there is no reason not to relocate.	No action required at the present – recognition by players that timelines had to be significantly advanced during the exercise to meet objectives.	No action	Not applicable
8	Hospital Lockdown Post exercise there was a point raised about the hospitals requiring an operational plan for hospital lockdown.	James Cook and North Tees Hospitals are in process of producing / having lockdown policies. Once completed, they need to be referred to within the REPPIR plan and also included as part of the SCC training day.	Acute Trusts / CEPU / HPA	September 2011

9	<p>Facilities in Exercise Control Exercise control was vastly improved from the previous exercise Jordan. Improvements included</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Landlines into silver/SCC and the borough Centre 2. Airwaves sets acting as an exercise net. 3. Ability to put actions directly onto police log. 4. Line in and line out 5. Numbering of injects allowing complete actions to be timed, recorded and where required followed up 6. Prioritisation of injects allowing a judgement to be made on which were essential for the exercise and which were solely to add realism. 	<p>Exercise control facilities to be maintained for future exercises.</p>	<p>Police / Exercise Planning Group</p>	<p>Ongoing</p>
10	<p>Liaison officer from EDF/BE at Silver A request was made by the Silver Commander for representation from British Energy at Silver Command to fulfil a similar role to that undertaken by the Company Representative agreed with local COMAH operators. This request was refused by exercise directors on the basis of there being no such function in the offsite plan.</p>	<p>Awareness to be raised at SCC training that there will be no representative at Tactical Command from the Operator.</p>	<p>CEPU, EDF, CPS and HPA.</p>	<p>Next SCC training day</p>
		<p>Offsite plan to be reviewed regarding the requirement for role of company representative at Silver.</p>	<p>CPS/CEPU/BE</p>	<p>September 2011</p>
		<p>If a persistent request, gap analysis will need to be undertaken to identify missing information. EDF/BE to be approached again.</p>	<p>CEPU to monitor</p>	<p>Ongoing monitoring</p>

11	<p>Use of civilian players at the RPMD</p> <p>Some criticism of the evacuee players at the SRC was received i.e. that they were poorly prepared and did not feed the required information in at the appropriate time.</p>	In future exercises that require the monitoring of casualties, RPMD to be involved in the provision of players and developing credible background and information/scripting.	CEPU lead officer and RPMD	Any future exercises involving RPMD
12	<p>Logging</p> <p>Some specific training was requested by players in the role of Local Authority strategic loggists.</p>	CEPU to develop the training used for tall ships personnel and provide 2 training sessions per year.	CEPU	March 2011
13	<p>Background Knowledge/Awareness</p> <p>Better familiarisation of the REPPIR Offsite plan and the information contained in it required by several 'players'.</p> <p>Whilst the SCC familiarisation training day is a positive addition it was felt that some of the information contained in the day could be improved to include more specific information on Hartlepool and the specific planned countermeasures and communities at risk.</p>	Review of SCC familiarisation day content to ensure specific information contained in the offsite plan is covered.	Police / BE / CEPU Lead Officer	September 2011
		CEPU to review and if necessary develop a basic knowledge check for staff who have roles as advisors to be undertaken in addition to the SCC familiarisation day.	CEPU	March 2011

CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT

Report to: Emergency Planning Joint Committee
From: Chief Emergency Planning Officer
Date: 23 September 2010
Subject: **Influx of British Nationals Plan**

1. Purpose of Report

- 1.1 To outline the plan prepared by the Emergency Planning Unit to meet the requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and which addresses the risk of the influx of British Nationals shown in both the national risk register and the Cleveland Community Risk Register.
- 1.2 To inform Members how the plan assists in the identification and provision of humanitarian assistance required in the event of an influx of British Nationals covering from the initial influx through to resettlement / repatriation.
- 1.3 To inform members that Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit, in consultation with partners, has prepared a plan to meet the various scenarios arising from the influx of British nationals into the Cleveland area by plane or other forms of transport.

2. Background

- 2.1 This plan has been produced to meet the risk of a sudden influx of British nationals. Although it is focused on support for British nationals, many of the principles also apply in the event of mass immigration of foreign nationals due to similar scenarios. The reasons for an influx are various and could result from international tension/conflict, pandemic flu etc.
- 2.2 The strategic lead in an influx would be expected to come from central government. Depending on the scenario this could be a combination of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat or the Department for Culture Media and Sport.
- 2.3 An influx could involve direct entry into Cleveland, most likely through Durham Tees Valley Airport, or through transportation from another

transport hub i.e. another UK airport. However, there could be sporadic entry into Cleveland over an extended period of time.

- 2.4 The aim of the plan is to assist in the identification and provision of humanitarian assistance required in the event of an influx of British Nationals. This covers from the initial influx through to resettlement/repatriation. Likely issues that would need to be dealt with are outlined in the plan and include:
- The influx;
 - Initial Reception and Triage;
 - Short Term Welfare;
 - Long Term Welfare;
 - Return/Resettlement
- 2.5 The objectives of the plan are:
- To identify the activation and communications required to manage such an incident.
 - To identify the mechanisms in place to deliver humanitarian assistance.
 - To minimise the impact on normal service provision.
 - To identify and plan for the likely contingencies required.
 - To identify the responsibilities of agencies in dealing with such an incident.
 - To comply with legislation including the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and any other emergency legislation that may be passed as a result of the event.
- 2.6 In the event of evacuees being brought into the Cleveland area, the chair of the Cleveland Local Resilience Forum (LRF), through the Chief Emergency Planning Officer as the LRF Manager, would call a multi-agency Strategic Coordinating Group meeting to agree the necessary Cleveland wide strategy and the provision of appropriate support. An LRF media strategy would also be formulated. A Tactical Group would also be called together within the terms of the Local Resilience Working Group with membership predominantly from the Local Authorities, Emergency Services and Voluntary Agencies/Groups e.g. British Red Cross and WRVS.
- 2.7 Flowcharts in sections four and five of the plan cover both direct and indirect influx procedures and possible issues which may arise. Section six details the reception process and a draft agenda for a Local Resilience Forum meeting is included at Annex A as a general guide of issues to be considered.
- 2.8 The plan has been subject to a consultation exercise with those agencies and organisations shown as having roles and responsibilities within the

plan and any comments taken into consideration in the final plan. Copies of the final plan have been circulated to Category 1 responders and all agencies with identified roles. Additional copies of the plan are available from the Emergency Planning Unit.

3 Recommendations

3.1 Members note the report.

Report Author: Denis Hampson
Chief Emergency Planning Officer and LRF Manager

Report Dated: 12 September 2010

CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT

Report to: Emergency Planning Joint Committee
From: Chief Emergency Planning Officer
Date: 23 September 2010
Subject: Hartlepool Tall Ships Race

1. Purpose of Report

- 1.1 To inform Members of the initial feedback from the Tall Ships Race event in Hartlepool, primarily in respect of the tasks and responsibilities undertaken by Emergency Planners, the Safety Advisory Group which was chaired by the Chief Emergency Planning Officer and Event Control (command and control).
- 1.2 To provide Members with details of the initial lessons learned ('positives' and 'negatives') encountered during the event. However, it is stressed that this is only an initial snapshot and from the viewpoint as stated in section 1.1.

2. Background

- 2.1 The Tall Ships Race came to Hartlepool during the period 6-10 August 2010. In total, 58 ships arrived and where berthed in both the port area and the marina.
- 2.2 The hosting this venture was undertaken by Hartlepool Borough Council in conjunction with PD Ports and Hartlepool Marina.
- 2.3 In addition to the Tall Ships there was a varied entertainments programme with live music on the main stage in the Tall Ships Village on four evenings and a firework display on three successive nights. The Tall Ships village was set up on the land of PD Ports to house many varied stalls and marquees and catering/refreshment outlets.
- 2.4 To oversee the event and make both tactical and strategic decisions as appropriate, a multi-agency Event Control was established in Mandale House, Hartlepool which operated 24hrs a day over the full period of the event. An operational Site Control was also established on site.

- 2.5 The event is considered to have attracted in excess of 750,000 people over the period and there has been a great deal of very positive feedback received from the general public.
- 2.6 A hot debrief was held at the Maritime Experience, Hartlepool on behalf of the Council on Friday 13 August with the salient 'positives' and 'negatives' as they relate to the emergency planning, safety advisory and command and control functions are shown at **annex A**. These points will assist in a more formal structured debrief which will be held in October and allow a full report to be produced.
- 2.7 Emergency planners within the EPU have held their own internal debrief and primarily reflect the points raised at **annex A**.
- 2.8 There were no points highlighted that needed urgent or immediate actions.
- 2.9 Many of the agencies involved, e.g. Police, First Aid agencies and Highways Agency, are to hold their own internal debrief processes over the forthcoming four to six weeks and this will allow more information to be fed into the continuing debrief process.
- 2.10 The event has been seen as an outstanding success and raised the profile and reputation of Hartlepool. Early indications are that the economy of Hartlepool and the North East has received a boost from hosting the event.
- 2.11 Most of the LRF agencies and organisations were involved in both the planning and delivery of the event in some way and are to be congratulated on the contributions they made to ensuring that the event was as successful as it was and passed without serious incident and without anyone receiving a serious injury. The event was a culmination of up to 3 years preparation and commitment by staff from a number of LRF agencies and organisations.
- 2.12 A number of plans were produced prior to the event and were the backbone of planning and preparation arrangements. All plans were subject to scrutiny and sign off by the Safety Advisory Group, led by the Chief Emergency Planning Officer. Plans included:
- Event Plan
 - Crowd Management Plan
 - Event Control, Safety and Emergency Plan*
 - Water Rescue Plan*
 - Transport and Travel Plan, including sections from the Highways Agency
 - Police Operational Order

- First Aid Plan (NEAS, Red Cross and St John's Ambulance)
- Fire Brigade Plan

The plans marked with an asterisk* were written within the EPU.

All these plans were supported by a comprehensive risk assessment matrix produced by the EPU and separate risk assessments for all the major risks overseen by the Health and Safety Co-ordinator.

- 2.13 There has been some criticism of the event received from the public, for example the uneven ground without the Tall Ships Village; parking for 'blue badge' holders considered too far from the 'village' and inadequate signage for pedestrians. Where possible, issues were addressed during the event, for example, a shuttle bus was put in place for blue badge holders and additional signage to direct pedestrians was arranged.
- 2.14 It is again stressed that this report provides just an early 'snapshot' and relates to the tasks and responsibilities undertaken by and within the EPU. The whole process is subject to further debriefing processes.

3. Recommendations

- 3.1 Members note the report.

Report Author: Denis Hampson
Chief Emergency Planning Officer

Report dated: 12 September 2010

Annex 'A'

Lessons Learned – Tall Ships Race, Hartlepool

Negatives

1. Stewarding – it was generally considered by a number of agencies that there had been a lack of briefing for the stewards in relation to what was expected from them; where they were to be located and what duties they would be doing. The representative within Event Control was continually being asked to inform stewards of their duties and what they should be doing.
2. Staffing – It became obvious that both Site Controller and Event Controller would have benefitted from having additional staff / a 'staff officer' and this would have made both locations more effective. For example, one person in Site Control was assigned to be the contact for all the traders on site which became a mammoth task. Further, within Event Control, the Event Controller would have benefitted from having a Staff Officer - at 'time outs' both the Event Controller and logistic were both occupied, leaving a contact gap within Event Control to deal with enquiries coming in.
3. Pedestrian / Information signage – the signage leading to the village was found to be insufficient, especially around the lock gates as the public continually tried to gain access via the lock gates; public went to the south side of the Marina area instead of the north and the stewards/Police had to continually direct the public towards the ships.
4. Marina Lock Gates – these were deemed no access for the general public by the Safety Advisory Group very early in the planning stage, due to the narrowness of them; danger of crushing and pedestrian pushed towards the waters edge. It had been agreed that 'access wristbands' would only be given to berth holders but many nearby residents and businesses gained access to the wrist bands, thus creating numerous problems and public disquiet. Better signage and stronger stewarding was provided after the second day and this greatly alleviated the issues.
5. Missing person protocol – this was included in the Event Control plan yet those staff involved did not adhere to it or know about it or what to do and indicated a lack of briefing or knowledge. Action was taken and the process improved.
6. Crew Parade route – agreements on the management of the parade had been made, particularly in respect of Harbour Walk and Middleton Road but were not adhered to 'on the ground', resulting in the parade having to

be stopped at the beginning of Harbour Walk due to congestion and in the interest of public safety.

7. Part of Event Control was used as the operational control for first aid agencies which led to increased congestion / noise issues.
8. Due to the physical structure of Event Control, the layout led to the traffic cell being somewhat isolated from the rest of event control.
9. Uneven surface in areas of Tall ships village, leading to difficulties for users of wheel chair, elderly persons and persons with children in pushchairs.
10. Concerns from 'blue badge' holders that the parking was too far away from the village area. This did impact upon the First Aid providers within the village area.

Positives

1. CCTV provision for the event and the monitoring provision within Event Control was extremely effective and proved invaluable providing images for pinch points and helping to validate decisions.
2. The first aid provision provided by North East Ambulance Service (NEAS), British Red Cross and St Johns Ambulance working as one unit was exceptional and really gave those involved in the event, both public and staff, reassurances that everything had been considered.
3. Traffic management of the event by Hattons Traffic Management Ltd, Highways Agency and the Transportation division of Hartlepool Council was effective and there were no significant issues or delays on the road network, either as motorists approached Hartlepool or in and around the town itself. It illustrated the need for pre-validation of the planning, together with scenario testing.
4. Briefings given to industry and road hauliers by the Chief Emergency Planning Officer assisted them in their planning but also assisted the event in diverting 'unnecessary' traffic.
5. The inter agency working within Event Control worked very well and a number of agencies remarked on it always being a calm atmosphere and any issues / problems being discussed together and mutually agreed decisions made. There were frequent multi-agency briefings (time-outs) at which problems were discussed and strategies developed and agreed, leading to all working to the same plan.

6. The entertainment schedule including the music and firework display over the three consecutive nights worked to ease the dispersion of people. The standard of the firework displays has been highly commended.
7. Marketing of the event was highly successful and generated media interest from across the world. Further, information to the public through the media was clear and concise, especially the Tall Ships website. The website was updated on a frequent basis and assisted with getting traffic and travel arrangements out to the public.
8. Reactive Responses – decisions were made in a timely manner in both Event and Site Controls. For example, additional information signs were produced overnight on both Saturday and Sunday to assist with public information, diverting public away from pinch points etc. Further, a shuttle bus for disabled people to take them from the car park to the site itself was introduced to meet concerns fed into Event Control.
9. Location of event control – on periphery of event site, yet close enough for physical checking of site but far enough away for calm atmosphere. Appreciation to Tees PCT for allowing use of facility.
10. Buses for the Park and Ride sites were efficient and well organised.
11. Learning and improvement as the event progressed e.g. stewards improvement

CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT

Report to: Emergency Planning Joint Committee
From: Chief Emergency Planning Officer
Date: 23 September 2010
Subject: Severe Winter Weather and Council Winter Maintenance Programmes

1. Purpose of Report

- 1.1 To inform Members of the report published by the Local Government Association entitled “Weathering the Storm – Improving UK Resilience to Severe Winter Weather” following a review of how councils and others responded to the prolonged periods of severe weather in the winter of 2009/10.
- 1.2 To inform Members of a similar report produced by an Independent Review Panel established by the Department of Transport entitled “The Resilience of England’s Transport System in Winter”. This report is an interim report with the final report expected in the Autumn.
- 1.3 To inform Members that the LGA made 10 recommendations whilst the Department of Transport report made 17 recommendations. Both reports link the response to severe weather in with the general resilience of local authorities, although the DfT report is stronger and recommends that “local highways authorities should treat their winter service planning as an integral part of the wider general resilience planning for civil contingencies” (recommendation 11). To date whilst winter maintenance plans have been produced by each local authority, they have stood outside resilience/emergency planning for civil contingencies.

2. Highway Responsibilities

- 2.1 The four Local Authorities as Highway Authorities have a duty to repair and maintain the highway (Section 41 of the Highways Act 1980). The Councils have additional duties under the Highways Act 1980 (Section 41(a)) as amended by the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 in respect of snow and ice.

- 2.2 The duty is to ensure so far as is reasonably practicable, that safe passage along the highway is not endangered by snow and ice, but it is not an absolute duty. "Reasonably practicable" and "endangered" are open to interpretation on the facts of each case, so in essence, the Councils must show that reasonable steps have been taken to discharge the duty.
- 2.3 In addition, the Traffic Management Act of 2004 imposed a duty on local authorities to manage its Highway Network in order to minimise disruption to all road users including pedestrians and cyclists.
- 2.4 In practical terms, where a Highway Authority has a Winter Maintenance Plan in place and it is followed, this will generally be considered to have discharged the winter maintenance duty.

3. Winter Maintenance Plans

- 3.1 For a number of years, all the Council's have produced their Winter Maintenance Plans and published it on their council website. The plan forms the basis of the winter maintenance service and the discharge of the duty under Section 41(a) of the Highways Act. The plan is reviewed annually to take into account changes in the highway network, operational management, materials & plant and emerging best practice.
- 3.2 The plan is broadly based along the following principles:
- The highway network is categorised into a hierarchy of relative importance and priority, and this links with other general highway maintenance principles and Codes of Practice.
 - Weather information from the Meteorological Office is the primary source of evidence informing the decision making process of when and where to invoke gritting/salting operations.
 - Priority is given towards ensuring that the identified carriageway network is maintained safe and passable.
 - Main/priority pedestrian routes are identified and scheduled in the plan for treatment when resources permit (i.e. are not otherwise committed to carriageway treatment).
 - The Council's scheduled road and footway salting/clearance is supplemented by the provision of salt bins for public use on roads and footways which are not included on scheduled gritting runs.

3.3 The decision to commence salting operations is made by the Duty Manager (Highway's or Infrastructure Services) in response to weather bulletins from the Met Office and predictions from the Ice Prediction System.

4. Winter 2009/2010: Local and National Reaction to the Severe Weather

4.1 In each council the standby/call out arrangements for winter maintenance commenced at the beginning of October 2009 and the duty officer rota was initiated.

4.2 Wednesday 16 December 2009 saw the start of what was to be the worst of the winter weather for 30 years, lasting until 18 January 2010. The severe and prolonged conditions placed strain on the four local authorities' ability to deliver its commitments detailed in their Winter Maintenance Plans.

4.3 During this period, most days saw 2 full gritting runs, where gritters were utilised for around 6 hours each and on the worst day, gritters were deployed for around 14 hours each. The operations continued well into February before the frequency reduced. During this period, salt stocks were put under severe strain and ran low on a number of occasions due to small but frequent deliveries as a result of national priorities being established. However, priority 1 routes and bus routes were generally kept open across the Cleveland area.

4.4 The effect of the severe weather across Cleveland was very similar to that in other parts of the Country, as indicated in the local and national press and media, and consequently salt stocks were being used up. In recognition of this, the Government introduced meetings of the 'Salt Cell' which had some influence on the national distribution of salt during the prolonged severe weather. The Salt Cell concluded that due to the prolonged nature of the severe conditions, the country's salt supply was unable to meet demands during such events. In one 24 hour period, some 194,000 tonnes of salt was spread nationwide whereas the maximum daily production of salt within the UK is 12,000 tonnes. Government then asked Councils to reduce usage by 40 to 50%.

4.5 The need for prudence regarding salt stocks resulted in a temporary suspension of refilling of the salt bins during the worst of the winter weather and different grit spreading regimes applied.

4.6 During the worst periods, the call centres within the councils received a high volume of calls for snow clearance/gritting and additional salt bins. In terms of snow clearance, at times, the snow was so deep and ice was so

compacted away from the Priority routes that ploughs were ineffective. The requests for additional salt bins were judged in accordance with a assessment criteria. Salt bins can only ever be used for treatment of small, discrete areas and are unsustainable in extreme circumstances.

- 4.7 In some areas, manual snow clearing of footpaths was undertaken when operatives were prevented from carrying out normal duties by bad weather. Typically it is unusual for snow or ice to remain present for more than a few days, so normally very little manual snow clearance takes place. The conditions in early 2010 however were such that manual labour was deployed a number of times in clearing footpaths, other priority pedestrian areas and side roads which were not part of gritting runs.

5. LGA Report

- 5.1 The report by the Local Government Association was published in July 2010 after it took evidence from councils, public service providers, transport operators, the business community and the two main UK salt suppliers, Cleveland Potash and Salt Union. They also examined the role of the Governments 'Salt Cell' that was established to have a centrally controlled prioritisation of salt deliveries across the country.
- 5.2 The LGA report findings consider that:
- councils were not well prepared to deal with a severe winter;
 - councils should have had greater stocks of salt;
 - that there should have been more mutual aid between councils;
 - that the public's expectations were too high;
 - there could have been more self help by and between the public;
 - the Governments 'Salt Cell' should have been opened earlier and been more proactive and effective.
 - the supply of salt from the three main salt suppliers was inadequate and could not cope with increased demand and also the communication between the salt suppliers and their customers (highway authorities) was problematic.
- 5.3 The report provides 10 recommendations, aimed at councils, local transport operators, central government and salt suppliers, which the aim of improving the winter maintenance programme for 2010/11 and how salt is secured/supplied to councils.
- 5.4 The first two recommendations seek councils, service providers, emergency services and business to work together to ensure a clear message is given to the public on what will be done in the event of a severe winter and that co-ordinated plans reflect priority needs.

- 5.5 The third recommendation considers that service providers (Highways Agency, Councils) and business should ensure they have business continuity plans in place to respond effectively in the event of reduced road networks and suspension of services.
- 5.6 Recommendation 4 calls on the Government to either issue clear guidance that persons will not be subject to litigation should they clear footpaths themselves or bring forward legislation to clarify the position.
- 5.7 The next two recommendations call upon the salt suppliers to have better business continuity plans in place to meet extra demand if necessary and also have improved communications with the Salt Cell and their customers so information on supplies and deliveries is accurate and timely.
- 5.8 Recommendations 7 and 8 seek improvements to the operation of the Salt Cell with clear terms of reference and a framework for operation and trigger mechanisms. The Salt Cell needs to have a secured way of working with the salt suppliers.
- 5.9 The final two recommendations consider that councils or groups of councils should have strategic reserves of salt and all councils should inform the Department for Transport of their salt stocks and re-stocking requirements.

6. Department for Transport report

- 6.1 The report follows similar lines of enquiry and reaches similar conclusions to that of the LGA report. The report authors see the need for a strategic reserve of salt and for councils to undertake wider consultation on their winter maintenance plans and undertaken more systematic year round processes for data collection on salt stocks. They recommend greater use of mutual aid and sharing of salt between councils and an authoritative review of technical standards to the treatment and spread rates of salt.
- 6.2 The report also follows the concerns expressed by the LGA over the clearing of footpaths by the public and business owners and seeks a code of practice to be issued by the Government before the winter period.
- 6.3 Much of the trust of the report and what will be in the final report is about making the national 'salt cell' more effective and ensuring that salt is targeted at the priority areas.
- 6.4 The main issue relating to emergency planning is contained in recommendation 11 which advocates the dovetailing of winter maintenance plans to the wider resilience and contingency planning framework.

7. Conclusions

- 7.1 Both these reports are receiving consideration within the Highways and Transportation areas of all four local authorities and are separate to the considerations being undertaken within the Emergency Planning Unit.
- 7.2 The LGA report was published in mid July 2010, followed later by the DfT report, by which time the four councils in the 'Cleveland area' had already placed salt orders with Cleveland Potash for the forthcoming winter period.
- 7.3 All four councils are in the process of producing their Winter Maintenance Plans for the 2010/11 winter which will include the priority routes; operational issues; salt storage capacities and mechanisms for escalation of response should the winter conditions demand it.
- 7.4 Each of the councils will publish their winter maintenance plans on their websites in or about October and have indicated that they will ensure that businesses, including town centre partnerships, are informed of the plans.
- 7.5 Some council's have reported to their Scrutiny Groups on the management and operation of the winter maintenance service. **Annex A** shows some facts and figures taken from the Middlesbrough report.
- 7.6 The experiences of last winter and the lessons learned highlight the need to keep the public informed, especially as public expectations exceed what can generally be achieved by the councils. This must also introduce the concept of self help and "good neighbour" schemes.
- 7.7 The EPU needs to ensure that the Winter Maintenance Plans dovetail with and into the multi-agency Adverse Weather Protocol and the local authorities Major Incident Plans.
- 7.8 The EPU must work closer with the Highways and Transportation sections and Media sections of the Councils during periods of severe winter weather extreme to ensure the dovetailing of plans and messages to the public.
- 7.9 The EPU who are the recipients of adverse weather warnings from the Met Office, will link more closely with relevant council departments to ensure knowledge is shared. (Highways Departments have their own computerised links to Met Office data)
- 7.10 The EPU will continue to disseminate weather information, bulletins from the "centre" and salt cell information quickly to relevant persons i.e. Chief Executive, Borough Emergency Co-ordination Officer and departments / sections to assist decision making within the councils.

- 7.11 The Chief Emergency Planning Officer will progress actions and best practice emanating from these reports and considerations through the multi-agency Local Resilience Working Group.
- 7.12 The Chief Emergency Planning Officer is working towards each of the four councils giving a short presentation on their winter maintenance plans for the coming winter period at the next meeting of the Cleveland Local Resilience Forum on 2nd December. This will ensure information is communicated to resilience partner agencies and thus allow them to plan appropriately.

8. Recommendations

- 8.1 That the report is noted.

Report Author: Denis Hampson
Chief Emergency Planning Officer

Report dated: 12 September 2010

BACKGROUND PAPERS

Weathering the Storm – LGA report
Resilience of England's Transport System in Winter – DfT report
Middlesbrough Council Winter Maintenance Plan 2009/2010
"Winter Services in West Lothian (leaflet)
"Are You Ready for Winter?" (Leaflet: Department for Transport)

Annex ‘A’

Middlesbrough Council’s Winter Maintenance Plan - Facts and Figures:

- Boulby Mine daily production: 9000 Tonnes
- Cargo Fleet Salt Barn Capacity: 3000 Tonnes
- Salt Deliveries to the Council: 100 to 180 Tonnes/day as requested
- Gritting Wagons (Capacity 8 Tonnes) 5 + 1 held in reserve
- Labour: 3 shifts of 5 men on call out.
- Priority 1 Gritting Routes 5 No. (total 278 Km)
- Priority 2 Gritting Routes 3 No.
- Average tonnage of Salt used per route 40 Tonnes
- Salt Bins: (Highway related) 129 bins (start of winter 2009/10)
- Average tonnage of Salt per refill of all bins 70 Tonnes (2 days to complete)
- Winter Maintenance Budget £306,000

Highway Statistics

	Kms	Miles
Roads:	503	311
Footways:	945	585
Cycleways:	31	19
Alleys:	35	22
 Gritting Routes:	 278	 172

CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT

Report to: Emergency Planning Joint Committee
From: Chief Emergency Planning Officer
Date: 23 September 2010
Subject: Management of the Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS) and National Resilience Extranet (NRE) update

1. Purpose of Report

- 1.1 To inform Members of the progress on the Management of the Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS) and National Resilience Extranet (NRE) scheme.
- 1.2 To inform Members of the next steps with the roll out of these schemes

2. NRE

- 2.1 The NRE is a secure web based browser tool that will enable responders to have access to key information up to and including RESTRICTED level, for multi-agency working and communication.
- 2.2 The benefits of signing to the NRE are:
 - Fast & secure information dissemination
 - Secure web based environment
 - Ability to store restricted information
 - Facilitates collaborate working between levels
 - Reduces admin burdens in sharing information
 - Provides a library of plans placed on secure pages by responding agencies and emergency planning
 - Full managed service with large storage capacity
 - Central storage area with ease of access
- 2.3 NRE is ran and managed by Ultra-Datel electronics on behalf of the Cabinet Office and the Government intend by early 2011 to use this system to circulate resilience and contingencies information rather than use e-mail. The EPU have sent off our expression of interest form and are

CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT

awaiting the connection agreement and details of the sponsors training in order to be able to use the system.

- 2.4 Once this training has been received and the digital certificate obtained, it is planned to roll out system to the other emergency responder agencies / organisations within the Cleveland area. This action plan has been agreed by the Resilient Telecommunications sub group chaired by a member of the Emergency Planning Unit.
- 2.5 There will need to be a small number of computer terminals in each local authority which have had the NRE system placed on the machine to allow access/usage. Each terminal will be subject to a licence obtained through Ultra-Datel.

3. MTPAS

- 3.1 MTPAS is the new and improved management process for the control and distribution of privileged access SIM enabled mobile phones. The system allows privileged users priority access to cellular radio network systems which might otherwise become congestion by non-essential users. A Network Service Provider may impose network access restrictions which only allow MTPAS SIM-enabled handsets to connect to its network at the request of the Gold Commander within Cleveland Police (nomally ACPO rank) or the Cabinet Office.
- 3.2 The Emergency Planning Unit have collated details of staff from Category 1 responders within Cleveland whom their agency / organisation considers should have this facility. (on average 20 staff in each organisation) These details have been passed to the network service providers with a request that the MTPAS upgrade is allocated to those mobile phone numbers identified across the Cleveland area.
- 3.3 The Emergency Planning Unit will manage the system on behalf of the Cleveland agencies/organisations through the LRF and the EPU will carry out an annual audit of MTPAS to ensure the data is still relevant and correct. A national audit is also to take place from September to December 2010 and the resilient telecommunications representatives of agencies in Cleveland were made aware of this fact at the Resilient Telecommunications sub group meeting held on 26th August so that “in house” audits can be performed.
- 3.4 The implementation process for the MTPAS scheme is shown at annex A.

CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT

4. **Recommendations**

4.1 Members note the report.


4.2 That Members note the leading role that the Emergency Planning Unit in undertaking in respect of ensuring these aspects of resilient communications are progressed.

Report Author: Denis Hampson
Chief Emergency Planning Officer and LRF Manager

Report dated: 12th September 2010

Annex A

CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT
MTPAS activation



CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT

Report to: Emergency Planning Joint Committee
From: Chief Emergency Planning Officer
Date: 23 September 2010
Subject: Town Centre Evacuation Planning

1. Purpose of Report

- 1.1 To inform Members of the resilience planning that is being undertaken in respect of the evacuation of the main town centres. Work has been ongoing for some time to produce a simple Evacuation Plan for Middlesbrough to inform businesses and the public of what might happen in the event of an evacuation being required of the town centre.
- 1.2 To inform Members that this plan is intended to assist with the management of an evacuation and to inform businesses how they can plan and ensure business continuity.

2. Background

- 2.1 The objectives of the plan are to:
 - provide information and advice on what actions to take in the event of an evacuation being required
 - provide information to residents, visitors and businesses as to how to obtain information on alerts and emergencies
 - provide information on good practice in preparing business continuity plans.
- 2.2 Extensive consultations have taken place regarding the plan including presentations to Council Officers, Town Centre Partnership and the Local Resilience Working Group. Positive feedback has been received throughout this process.

2.3 Implementation

Middlesbrough Council are to have the booklet printed in a modest way and then circulate them around properties in the town centre. They will use the current mechanisms for briefing businesses (town centre management meetings) and arrange to have some training and evacuation exercises to ensure that the document is as well understood as possible.

- 2.4 The document contains a suitable disclaimer regarding the liability of Middlesbrough Council and others. It is estimated that 3,000 copies will be printed.

3. Other Work Associated with Town Centre Evacuation Planning

- 3.1 The Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit already has plans which dovetail with the Middlesbrough Town Centre Evacuation plan booklet, namely:

- Transport Plan which would be implemented to move evacuation persons from designated rendezvous points to either Survivor Reception Centres or Rest Centres
- Local Authority Major Incident Response Plan (each Local Authority)
- Rest Centre Plans
- Survivor Reception Centre Plan
- Recovery Plan.

- 3.2 Whilst Middlesbrough Council and the Emergency Planning Unit have been instrumental in developing the Middlesbrough Town Centre plan booklet which is shown at annex 'A', large maps need to be produced to go with the booklet and which can be displayed prominently within work places across the town centre. The Cleveland Police Emergency Planning Unit are to have these maps produced on a cost neutral basis, with advertisements around the edge of the map paying for printing and management costs.

- 3.3 Whilst work on the Middlesbrough booklet and evacuation plan is nearing completion, timescales for the accompanying maps are awaited but work is ongoing.

- 3.4 The Middlesbrough booklet has been approved by the Local Resilience Forum and the same template will be used for booklets and plans for other town centre plans. Therefore the next stage, which is already underway, is to determine how similar booklets/plans are produced for the other main town centres across Cleveland, i.e. Stockton, Hartlepool and Redcar. Thereafter consideration will need to be taken in respect of other smaller centres e.g. Thomaby, Billingham, Yarm, Guisborough. This work is being

undertaken jointly by staff from Emergency Planning Unit, staff from the Cleveland Police Emergency Planning Section and Local Authority / Town Centre representatives.

- 3.5 Any town centre evacuation plans must dovetail with the Cleveland Police evacuation plan which is being developed.

4 Recommendations

- 4.1 Members note the report and the Middlesbrough Town Centre Evacuation booklet

Report Author: Denis Hampson
Chief Emergency Planning Officer & LRF Manager

Report dated: 12th September 2010

Annex 'A'

Middlesbrough Town Centre Plan / Booklet

(The zonal map which will be a 'fold out' insertion at the back of the booklet is not included with the report due to document size in computer terms i.e. megabites)



MIDDLESBROUGH TOWN CENTRE EVACUATION PLAN



CONTENTS

	PAGE
1 Introduction	2
2 Objectives	2
3 Middlesbrough Town Centre Evacuation Plan	2
4 How An Evacuation Will Be Communicated	3
5 Evacuation Organisation	4
6 Business Continuity Advice	5
Town Centre Zone Map	Fold out at back

INTRODUCTION

The information and advice in this plan will assist anyone who may be involved in an evacuation of Middlesbrough Town Centre, to protect themselves before, during and after a major incident.

To assist with the management of an evacuation, the Middlesbrough Town Centre Evacuation Plan has divided the town centre into a series of zones. The plan assists visitors, residents and businesses, in Middlesbrough, to identify which zone they are situated in and how an evacuation will be organised. It also provides advice on preparing Business Continuity Plans.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this Plan are to:

- Provide information on how Middlesbrough Town Centre is divided into zones for evacuation purposes.
- Provide advice on actions to take in the event of an evacuation.
- Signpost visitors, residents and businesses in Middlesbrough to where they are able to access information regarding alerts and emergency incidents.
- Outline the communication methods to be used during emergency incidents.
- Provide an outline of the evacuation response.
- Provide information on good practice in preparing Business Continuity Plans

MIDDLESBROUGH TOWN CENTRE EVACUATION PLAN

Background

The boundary of the evacuation area reflects the local 'recognised area' of Middlesbrough town centre. In addition some housing adjoining the recognised area has been included to enhance the evacuation plan. To assist with any evacuation, the town centre has been divided into 35 zones. The zones vary in size but as far as possible have naturally defined boundaries. This makes it easier to identify and isolate specific areas. As far as practicable zones have been created that reflect principle uses e.g. business, retail, entertainment, transport, residential, etc. Larger complexes such as Middlesbrough College, Teesside University, Hill Street Centre, Middlesbrough Football Club etc are generally contained within separate evacuation zones.

Town Centre Zone Map

A Middlesbrough Town Centre Zone map is included at the back of this plan, and is also available in the form of a wallchart. This plan and the zone map can be downloaded from the Middlesbrough Council website: www.middlesbrough.gov.uk and the Cleveland Local Resilience Forum website: www.clevelandlrf.org.uk. The map is used by the emergency services and Middlesbrough Council to ensure consistency of approach in the management of emergencies that may require an evacuation.

HOW AN EVACUATION WILL BE COMMUNICATED

Cleveland Police and Middlesbrough Council will broadcast messages if any part of Middlesbrough Town Centre is to be evacuated. If you need to evacuate you will be notified by one or more means of communication (detailed below). As part of the evacuation process you will be given clear and specific directions where to go. Once you arrive at that location you will be met by an initial reception team. The point you are directed to may be in a building or may be outdoors, this will be dependant upon factors such as weather or time of day.

Communication Methods

In the event of an emergency incident, Cleveland Police and other agencies will issue emergency public information through a range of media including:

- ◆ BBC Radio Tees 95 FM and other radio stations such as TFM (96.6 FM) and Real Radio (100-102 FM).
- ◆ BBC Tees website (www.bbc.co.uk/tees)
- ◆ Various town centre radio systems such as the Shopwatch radios (used in many of the town centre stores) and the 'talking CCTV' speakers on street.
- ◆ An Automatic Voice Messaging (AVM) system for flood warnings from the Environment Agency – should it be a flooding incident.
- ◆ Public address systems and information screens in shopping centres, Middlesbrough bus and train stations and public squares such as Centre Square.
- ◆ Cleveland Police helicopter using its 'Skyshout' public address system.

- ◆ Emergency services staff on the scene.
- ◆ A dedicated and advertised public information phone number may be activated later into an incident.

The system is also dependant upon an element of “good neighbour” activities in so far as arranging cascade message systems within your own organisation or street.

EVACUATION ORGANISATION

During an evacuation the overall operation will be co-ordinated by Cleveland Police

The Emergency Services will be in attendance at the incident and their response will be dependent on the type of incident causing the evacuation and the scale of assistance required.

Carrying out an evacuation requires many different skills and disciplines which are offered by different organisations and agencies. This means that the best people and facilities to assist you will, if at all possible, be made available in a coordinated manner to manage the incident and reduce the impact upon you as far as possible. These agencies are listed below for your information.

- ◆ Cleveland Police
The primary function of the Police is to save life in conjunction with the other emergency services, and to co-ordinate the multi-agency response to a major incident.
- ◆ Cleveland Fire Brigade
The primary function of the Fire Brigade is to take charge of fire fighting and rescue operations. The Fire Service, within its normal role, provides a rescue capability to facilitate the freeing of trapped persons, decontamination capability, and also has an urban search and rescue capability.
- ◆ North East Ambulance Service
The response of the Ambulance Service includes the initial treatment and transportation of casualties to hospital and other centres. The Ambulance Service will also provide a direct route for all agencies into the NHS and act as the conduit to response functions being activated.

- ◆ Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit (CEPU)
CEPU ensure that Middlesbrough Council meet their legislative obligations in respect of resilience and emergency planning and responds to emergencies on behalf of Middlesbrough Council.
- ◆ Middlesbrough Council
In the event of an evacuation Middlesbrough Council will provide temporary shelter and accommodation to those people who have been evacuated from their homes or made homeless as a direct consequence of the incident. Middlesbrough Council will also endeavour to provide transport to assist with the evacuation.
- ◆ NHS Middlesbrough
The role of NHS Middlesbrough is to provide advice and guidance to local health practitioners dealing with the general public in the community (including pharmacies or GP's surgeries etc). NHS Middlesbrough would provide support to the NHS infrastructure and monitor public health following an incident.

BUSINESS CONTINUITY ADVICE

The need to prepare

All businesses in Middlesbrough, large or small, are vulnerable to accidents and emergencies. It is recognised that smaller businesses have fewer resources to devote to planning, and to deploy in a response and recovery effort after an incident. However, it is nevertheless important that they spend some time and effort to developing basic steps for business continuity.

While acts of terrorism can disrupt all businesses and should be planned for, they are still relatively rare. However, accidents such as a power failure or flooding due to a broken water main, can deprive a business of electrical or water supplies and damage or destroy stocks or documents.

The benefits of preparation – Business Continuity Management

According to the Cabinet Office's 'Preparing for Emergencies' website, experience from terrorist bombs and the fuel crisis of 2000, has shown that those businesses that prepare contingency and recovery plans and procedures have a much greater chance of surviving a major crisis than those that do not.

Business Continuity Management is a process to ensure that a business is prepared for the unexpected. This allows for a quick return to normal

operations after a major disruption. Identifying the key operations of a business allows it to identify which roles are critical in responding to an evacuation or major incident and how to recover after an incident to a position of normal business.

Developing an Evacuation Plan for your Organisation

The keysteps to developing your own evacuation plan are as follows:

- ◆ **Senior Management Backing**
Senior management must recognise the need for an evacuation plan and provide backing / resources to ensure that it is produced, kept up-to-date and included in operational routines.
- ◆ **Know Your Business**
The next step is to look at the organisation's activities that may be affected by a town centre evacuation and identify the key personnel to be involved.
- ◆ **Assess the Risks**
Identify threats in terms of the events or incidents that may give rise to an evacuation of your business and what the consequences will be for the whole organisation. It is good practice to work through your risks from low level to worst case scenario.
- ◆ **Draft Your Evacuation Plan**
Develop a clear set of procedures for your organisation to enable it to respond to evacuation incidents, whatever their cause. This is particularly important in the first hours of any incident, when senior managers may not be present. Consult and co-ordinate your arrangements with neighbours, the emergency services, and local authority emergency planning units.
- ◆ **Test Your Evacuation Plan**
Brief and train your staff; exercise the plan on paper and in 'table-top' run through exercises; do fire drills and test calls and take part in 'live' exercises to practice roles and identify weaknesses; adjust the plan accordingly and start again.

Being Excluded from Your Premises

You need to consider the impact of being excluded from your premises for differing time periods when drafting Evacuation Plans and what strategies

are required to respond to and recover from an incident. Look at issues such as:

- ◆ how will an incident impact on your organisation if you are excluded from your building for:
 - one hour (e.g. checking for a potential hoax call)
 - several hours (e.g. an identifiable incident)
 - overnight (e.g. an incident where a device has gone off and caused minor damage)
 - some considerable time (e.g. significant damage to an area)
- ◆ what would be the effect on your activities of such disruption?
- ◆ how quickly could you restart your activities after such disruptions?
- ◆ which activities are critical to resuming your core business?

Emergency Grab Bags

For any incidents which would require evacuation of the premises it is advisable to consider having an emergency 'grab bag' (sometimes known as 'battle boxes') at an identified control point. This can hold key items to use in an emergency. Suggested items to include are (this list is not exhaustive):

Documents

- ◆ business continuity plan
- ◆ list of employees with contact details
- ◆ contact lists for key customers, suppliers, and maintenance contractors
- ◆ contact details for utility companies
- ◆ building site plan
- ◆ latest stock and equipment inventory
- ◆ insurance company details
- ◆ financial and banking information

Equipment


- ◆ first aid kit
- ◆ spare keys / security codes
- ◆ torch and spare batteries
- ◆ portable or wind-up radio
- ◆ mobile phones (preferably on different networks) and charger
- ◆ message pads, marker pens and general stationery
- ◆ money (enough to get staff home and buy them a meal)

Laminated 'X' Signs

When a premises has been evacuated, it is useful to the emergency services to have some indication that the premises are no longer occupied. It is suggested that an 'X' laminated sign is placed in a prominent place, e.g. the front/main access doors to the premises, to indicate a full evacuation has taken place. If the suggested sign is to be utilised, it must be emphasised that **the placing of the sign should only be undertaken when the evacuation coordinator has confirmation that no one is left within the premises**. See below for a suggested sign.

'ALL CLEAR' SIGN

<p>Full Evacuation has taken place from these premises</p> <p>Date:</p> <p>Time:</p> <p>Contact No.</p>



DISCLAIMER

Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit has developed this guidance in association with Middlesbrough Council and Cleveland Police on behalf of Cleveland Local Resilience Forum. It is the responsibility of businesses, residents and visitors to take appropriate steps to safeguard their premises and personal health and safety by developing and implementing appropriate plans.

Whilst every care has been taken in the preparation of this publication, Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit, Cleveland Local Resilience Forum, Middlesbrough Council or Cleveland Police will not be liable for any loss, damage or costs of any nature arising directly or indirectly from reliance placed on the material in this guidance booklet.

This information was produced by Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit in association with Middlesbrough Council and Cleveland Police on behalf of the Cleveland Local Resilience Forum



CLEVELAND EMERGENCY PLANNING UNIT

Report to: Emergency Planning Joint Committee
Report from: Chief Emergency Planning Officer
Date: 23 September 2010
Subject: **REPORTED INCIDENTS / CLEVELAND COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY**

1. Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 To inform Members of the Emergency Planning Joint Committee of the incidents reported, severe weather and flood risk warnings received and communications strategy faxes received and dealt with by the Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit. The report covers the period between 1 June 2010 and 10 September 2010.

2. Flood and Weather Warnings

- 2.1 During this period the Emergency Planning Unit received a total of 16 warnings from the Met Office relating to adverse weather conditions, many of these out of hours:

- 12 flash warnings of heavy rainfall
- 3 Extreme rainfall alerts

- 2.2 The Regional Met Office Advisor for Cleveland has continued to provide a more detailed summary of the weather when the need arises and provided detailed forecasts for the period of the Tall Ships Race in August. On receipt weather and flood warnings are distributed to the Chief Executives and senior officers within each of the local authorities, together with members of the Flood Risk group.

- 2.3 There were 16 flood related warning messages received from the Environment Agency/North East Flood Advisory Service. The EPU have been involved with three tele-conference calls with the EA and Met Office over the three extreme rainfall alerts.

- 2.4 The Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit are recipients of messages from the Met Office in relation to their new Severe Weather Emergency Response Service. This service is available to emergency planners through a secure web based browser, password protected, on the Met Office website. The scheme is designed to give early and/or immediate warnings of extreme rainfall which has the potential to cause surface water flooding. This is

flooding caused by the amount of rain water that falls in one area in a short space of time and to which the drainage systems cannot cope and thus flooding occurs. It may also occur due to rivers and streams already being full due to persistent rain. The Duty Emergency Planning Officer receives this information from the Met Office both by fax and text message.

- 2.5 This scheme is in addition to the traditional Flood Warnings issued by the Environment Agency. However these flood warnings only warn of flooding that is caused from rivers, streams and becks overflowing and the sea overtopping. Consequently there have been occasions when the EPU receives both a warning of extreme rainfall from the Met Office and a Flood Warning from the Environment Agency for the same location/area.

3. Communications Strategy

- 3.1 During the period the Emergency Planning Unit received and dealt with 22 'blue' faxes which had been issued by the Operators or Agencies involved with the strategy. They range from information about:

- Unexpected alarms sounding which can be heard off site
- Excessive flaring
- Small releases of chemicals.
- Unexpected fumes / smoke from chimneys / plants

- 3.2 Of these 22 faxes, many were received and dealt with by the Duty Emergency Planning Officer outside normal office hours.

- 3.3 All were blue faxes which are for information only but where appropriate, the local authorities were advised and therefore able to 'field' questions from either the media or the public.

- 3.4 There were no red faxes issued.

4. Incidents of Note (1 June 2010 to 10 September 2010)

- 4.1 In the past three months there have been 12 incidents of note in which the Emergency Planning Unit became involved and on some occasions saw the deployment of staff to the scene or Incident Command Rooms to represent the Local Authorities.

- 4.2 The table at **appendix 'A'** gives brief details of these incidents.

- 4.3 A number of other incidents of a minor nature were also reported to Cleveland Emergency Planning Unit, some of which were dealt with by the Duty Officer 'out of hours'. Most were dealt with quickly and several only necessitated the provision of advice.

5. Recommendation

5.1 That Members note the report

Report Author: Denis Hampson
Chief Emergency Planning Officer

Report dated: 12 September 2010

Appendix 'A'

Incidents 1 June 2010 to 10 September 2010

Date	Location	Type of Incident (i)	Type of Incident (ii)	Brief Description
1 June 2010	Norton	Large amount of chemicals found	Chemical	Large amount of various chemicals found in the home of an ex-chemical w ho had died suddenly. Specialist disposal company called to deal
18 June 2010	Seashore, Boulby	Dead w hale	Potential environmental	Body of whale w ashed up on shoreline under cliffs. Worked with EHOs and media.
21 June 2010	Portrack Lane Stockton	Fire		Large fire in industrial building w hich threatened nearby premises.
22 June 2010	Seal Sands	Partial failure of chemical tank	Chemical release	Failure of lagging on propane tank allow ing fumes to be emitted
27 June 2010	Park Lane, Guisborough	Fire	Asbestos	Fire in old church w hich w as found to contain asbestos that w as being disturbed by fire and fire response.
13 July 2010	Billingham	Chemical release		Release of ammonia follow ing plant incident on chemical works
20 July 2010	Several locations in Stockton and Billingham	Flooding		Due to a short period of extremely heavy rainfall, several roads and gardens w ere flooded by surface w ater and minor intrusion of w ater into some homes
28 July 2010	A689 / A1085 Seal Sands Link Road	Chemical spill from road tanker		Spill from road tanker. Road closed for time until chemical dealt with
8 August 2010	Caldicotes Close, Grangetow n	House Fire		Fire in residential house. Nearby residents evacuated until fire extinguished.
8 August 2010	Seal Sands Link Road	Chemical spill		Chemical spill from road tanker. Road closed for time w hilst chemical dealt with.

24 August 2010	Kader Community Centre, Middlesbrough	Leak of chemical		Leak of chemical – two persons received treatment for inhalation of fumes
6 Sept 2010	Ow ton Manor Lane, Hartlepool	Fire / cylinder explosion		Fire at disused farm building. Gas cylinder exploded. No injuries. Area cordoned off.